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REGULATORY TAKINGS IN CANADA 
DR. BRYAN P. SCHWARTZ∗  
MELANIE R. BUECKERT∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Canadian law lacks a robust “regulatory takings” doctrine, a 
phenomenon partially explained by Canada’s unique constitutional 
backdrop. Some Canadian provinces have statutes that provide greater 
protection for certain property rights. Canada also has international trade 
obligations that require it to protect foreign investors’ property rights. The 
only indirect recognition and remuneration of regulatory takings is 
encompassed in a longstanding interpretive presumption in favor of 
compensation in situations involving expropriation. Yet, despite all of 
these safeguards to protect property rights from regulatory takings and 
despite recent developments in regulatory takings jurisprudence, property 
rights receive minimal protection under Canadian law. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROTECTION OF PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN CANADA 
Canada’s constitutional framework lacks safeguards to protect property 
owners from governments that unjustifiably expropriate private property. 
In many instances, it fails to adequately compensate such property owners. 
 
 
 ∗ Dr. Bryan P. Schwartz, LL.B. (Queen’s), LL.M., J.S.D. (Yale), Asper Professor of 
International Business and Trade Law, University of Manitoba Law School. Dr. Schwartz is the author 
of seven books and over sixty academic articles in areas including constitutional law, international 
trade law, international business law, law and literature, and international organizations. He has 
frequently served as an advisor to Canadian governments on public policy or constitutional reform. As 
senior legal counsel with Pitblado LLP, Dr. Schwartz practices in many areas of public and private law 
and has participated in over a dozen cases at the Supreme Court of Canada. Dr. Schwartz is also a 
labor and commercial arbitrator and served on the investor-state panel in the S.D. Myers case under 
NAFTA. 
 ∗∗ Melanie R. Bueckert, LL.B., graduated from the University of Manitoba as the Gold Medalist 
in Law in 2003. Ms. Bueckert is currently employed as a legal researcher with the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal. She has written and lectured on privacy, labor, and employment law matters as a sessional 
lecturer at the University of Manitoba Faculty of Law.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p477 Schwartz Bueckert book pages.doc 6/5/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
478 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 5:477 
 
 
 
 
A. The 1867 Constitution 
Canada’s constitution was originally a British statute called the 
Constitution Act, 1867 (the “1867 Constitution”).1 The 1867 Constitution 
stated that Canada was to have a constitution “similar in principle” to the 
British Constitution.2 However, the 1867 Constitution, like the British 
Constitution, lacked a comprehensive bill of rights. The 1867 Constitution 
did not explicitly protect individual human rights. The only legal 
protection for freedom and equality came from provincial common law, 
except in Quebec, where protection came from the Civil Code. Even so, 
provincial legislatures in all provinces have the supreme authority to 
change provincial common law and civil codes. Specifically, provincial 
legislatures may change private property laws, but they are expected to do 
so realizing that they are democratically-elected bodies. 
Extra-judicial procedural safeguards against regulatory takings 
appeared in several places. At the provincial level, federally-appointed 
provincial lieutenant governors could veto provincial property-
expropriating legislation. However, in reality, provincial lieutenant 
governors did not override such legislation because they were hesitant to 
veto legislation that was enacted by democratically-elected provincial 
legislatures. In addition, upper houses of provincial governments acted as 
chambers of sober second thought, much like the House of Lords in the 
United Kingdom. However, these chambers were eventually abolished. 
The federal government can simply “disallow” property-expropriating 
legislation. However, like the provincial lieutenant governors, the federal 
government in actual practice does not override such legislation by 
democratically-elected provincial legislatures.  
The Federal Senate is explicitly designated to protect the interests of 
the property-owning classes.3 The Canadian Constitution requires that 
Senate members have substantial net worth and hold a specified amount of 
real property.4 Because the federal government lacks primary authority 
over property and civil rights, the Senate plays a limited role in protecting 
property rights. In theory, the Senate can block legislation from the House 
of Commons that expropriates property without compensating property 
owners. But even where the Senate has the authority to block such 
 
 
 1. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5 (Appendix 
1985). 
 2. Id. pmbl. 
 3. Id. § 23. 
 4. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. ch. 3, § 23(3), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5 (Appendix 
1985). 
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legislation, it rarely does so for several reasons. First, the Senate lacks 
democratic legitimacy vis-à-vis the democratically-elected House of 
Commons. Second, the Senate lacks moral authority because it 
consistently fails to account for the increasing population of the western 
Canadian provinces. In fact, some critics have charged that Senate 
membership has become a highly paid patronage award bestowed on 
friends of the governing party.5 
B. The Canadian Bill of Rights  
In 1960, the federal government enacted the Canadian Bill of Rights, 
which protects the right not to be deprived of “life, liberty, security of the 
person and enjoyment of property” except by “due process of law.”6 
However, its reach is limited in two ways. First, the Canadian Bill of 
Rights applies only to the federal government, and subsequent legislatures 
have the authority to repeal it.7 Second, under the Canadian Bill of Rights, 
measures infringing on property owners’ right to the enjoyment of 
property need only satisfy procedural fairness;8 no case holds that “due 
process of law” also requires substantive fairness, such as just 
compensation. 
C. The 1982 Constitution 
In 1982, Canada’s constitution underwent its most extensive overhaul 
since its enactment in 1867. The centerpiece was the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”).9 The Charter differed from the 
Canadian Bill of Rights in that the Charter applied to both the federal and 
provincial governments. In addition, the Charter could only be altered 
through a formal amendment process due to its constitutional character.10 
Section 7 of the Charter recognizes the right to “life, liberty, and 
security of the person.”11 The framers of the 1982 Constitution avoided 
 
 
 5. See, e.g., Gordon Gibson, Challenges in Senate Reform: Conflicts of Interest, Unintended 
Consequences, New Possibilities, 83 PUB. POL’Y SOURCES 1 (2004), available at http://www.fraser 
institute.ca/admin/books/files/ChallengesInSenateReform.pdf. 
 6. Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960 S.C., ch. 44 (Can.). 
 7. Id. § 1(a). 
 8. Authorson v. Canada (A.G.), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 40 (Can.).  
 9. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). 
 10. The amendment process requires the consent of seven provinces with half the population of 
Canada as well as the Federal House of Commons. 
 11. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 7 
(U.K.). In Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (Can.), Chief Justice Dickson 
compared the wording of section 7 to the “Due Process” Clause in the American Bill of Rights and 
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recognizing property and other economic rights because they feared that 
Canadian courts would use it to block social welfare legislation,12 similar 
to how U.S. courts invoked the Due Process Clause to block New Deal 
legislation during the 1930s and 1940s.13 But closer inspection of United 
States due process cases reveals that U.S. courts did not block social 
welfare legislation by invoking property interests; they blocked legislation 
by construing the liberty interest to extend to freedom of contract.14 
Canadian courts construed the omission of “property” from section 7 of 
the Charter as a strong indication that the courts must avoid reviewing 
government decisions involving economic matters and social spending.15 
Thus, in construing “security of the person” under section 7, the omission 
of the word “property” elsewhere has been interpreted as signaling that the 
right to social welfare is not included.16 
Section 8 of the Charter prohibits “unreasonable search and seizure.”17 
Canadian courts construe this provision narrowly to include actions for 
property takings during criminal investigations and to exclude deliberate 
property expropriations.18  
 
 
noted: “The intentional exclusion of property from s. 7, and the substitution therefor of ‘security of the 
person’ . . . leads to a general inference that economic rights as generally encompassed by the term 
“property” are not within the perimeters of the s. 7 guarantee.” Id. at 1003. 
 12. See Chief Justice Dickson’s comments in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 
927, 1003 (Can.). 
 13. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). The framers also avoided using the 
phrase “due process of law,” fearing that Canadian Courts would interpret the clause to include both 
substantive and procedural fairness. Instead, the Charter refers to “principles of fundamental justice.”
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Canada has construed “principles of fundamental justice” to 
include substantive fairness. See, e.g., Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 
S.C.R. 486, 504 (concluding that the limits of “principles of fundamental justice” were left to be 
defined within the acceptable sphere of judicial activity). 
 14. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (“The right to purchase or sell labor is part of the liberty 
protected by [the Fourteenth Amendment].”). 
 15. See, e.g., Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(C) of the Criminal Code, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 
(Can.). 
 16. See Gosselin v. Quebec (A.G.), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, 491 (Can.) (noting that whether section 
7 could operate to protect economic rights was an open question). 
 17. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 8 
(U.K.). 
 18. Becker v. Alberta, [1983] 148 D.L.R. (3d) 539 (Alta. C.A.) (“Section 8 does not extend to the 
taking of real property by expropriation.”). In Porter v. Canada, a federal court examined the 
provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and historical and current theories of 
forfeiture law, including comparative American law, to arrive at an appropriate balance between the 
longstanding practice of forfeiture and the contemporary emphasis on the sanctity of individual rights 
and freedoms. Porter v. Canada, [1989] 3 F.C. 403, 410–12 (T.D.). 
 In Porter, the plaintiff was apprehended for transporting “illegally manufactured spirits” and had 
his 1986 Toyota truck, valued at $14,000, seized under the Excise Act. Porter, 3 F.C. at 406–07. The 
Act provided that all such spirits and all vehicles used to transport them were to be forfeited to the 
Crown. Porter, 3 F.C. at 407. The federal court considered whether this forfeiture provision was 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss3/3
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Section 11 prohibits “cruel or unusual treatment” and is one of the few 
sections that indirectly protects property rights. For example, excessive 
fines or property forfeiture could be viewed as having an unreasonably 
harsh impact on the offender.19 
D. Implied Constitutional Rights 
Against the 1930s backdrop of Alberta’s “social credit” government, 
the Supreme Court of Canada considered whether there was an “implied 
bill of rights” in Canada, where judicially enforceable safeguards against 
extreme legislative action could be inferred from the structure of the 
Canadian Constitution.20 Some judges had suggested that the Canadian 
Constitution’s preamble, which refers to Canada as having a constitution 
“similar in principle” to that of the United Kingdom, permitted the courts 
to recognize and enforce certain unwritten principles.21  
Although the Supreme Court in A.G. (Can.) v. Montreal22 rejected the 
idea that there is an implied bill of rights, the Court has in more recent 
times acknowledged the possibility that Canada’s constitution includes 
certain unwritten principles.23 Nevertheless, the Court has noted that there 
are compelling reasons to insist upon the primacy of the written 
 
 
rendered inoperative due to the Charter. Porter, 3 F.C. at 418. The federal court determined that the 
action should be dismissed and that the forfeiture did not affect the plaintiff’s rights under the Charter. 
The court reasoned as follows: 
These cases lead one to the conclusion that Section 8 [of the Charter] is designed primarily to 
protect the privacy interests of individuals and affords protection to property only where that 
is required to uphold the protection of privacy. (In that sense, it might be said to be a 
“dependent” property right.) In the case before me, there is no allegation that any privacy 
interest of the plaintiff has been violated. The search which resulted in the discovery of the 
illicit spirits is presumed to be valid. Therefore, the subsequent seizure as forfeit (based on 
actual discovery of the spirits, not simply on a reasonable belief of their presence) cannot be 
gainsaid on the basis of the minimal “dependent” property rights which section 8 may be said 
to afford.  
Porter, 3 F.C. at 419–20. 
 19. See Bishop v. Annapolis, [1986] 37 L.C.R. 1, ¶ 19 (N.S.S.C.). The court held that since 
neither sections 7 nor 8 of the Charter protected property rights, the Charter did not affect the power of 
expropriation conferred by the Expropriation Act of Nova Scotia, even though no provision in that Act 
provided for a pre-expropriation hearing. 
 20. See generally In matter of Three Bills Passed by the Legislative Assembly of the Province of 
Alberta, [1938] S.C.R. 100 (concluding that because legislatures are democratically elected means 
there must be some protection for free expression). This case is often referred to as the “Alberta Press 
case.” 
 21. See, e.g., Reference Re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100 (Can.) (Duff, J.), available at 
http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1938/1938canlii1/1938canlii1.html. 
 22. A.G. (Can.) v. Montreal, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 770, 796–97 (Can.). 
 23. British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, ¶¶ 60–61 (Can.). 
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constitution, regardless of the existence of such unwritten principles.24 
Regardless, it is unlikely that these unwritten principles include the 
protection of property rights because the framers of the modern written 
constitution refused to recognize this principle. 
III. PROTECTION BEYOND THE CANADIAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
A. Provincial Protections 
Several provinces have enacted statutes to protect property rights. 
However, like the Canadian Bill of Rights, these statutes have only quasi-
constitutional force.  
Alberta’s “Personal Property Bill of Rights” (Alberta Bill of Rights) 
provides that the government can take property only if there is a process in 
place to determine compensation.25 First, the Alberta Bill of Rights 
protects only tangible property that can be physically touched, seen, 
moved, or physically possessed.26 The statute explicitly excludes 
intangible personal property, incorporeal rights, and interests in land.27 
Second, the taking of the property must amount to a permanent taking of 
title.28 The statute does not list lesser interferences, such as regulatory 
interference with the ability to use the property. Finally, nothing in the 
statute requires that the compensation be “just” or “adequate.” Alberta is 
considered the most conservative province, yet its statute weakly protects 
property from government expropriation.  
On the opposite end of the spectrum is Quebec’s “Charter of Human 
Rights and Freedoms” (Quebec Charter), the counterpart to the Federal 
Charter.29 The Quebec Charter applies to both government and private 
conduct. Unlike human rights codes that exist in other provinces, the 
Quebec Charter protects civil liberties30 and privacy31 and guarantees 
protection against discriminatory treatment.32 However, the Quebec 
Charter’s provisions governing property rights33 are as narrow and limited 
as those governing the Alberta Bill of Rights. 
 
 
 24. Id. ¶ 65. 
 25. Alberta Personal Property Bill of Rights, R.S.A., ch. A-31, § 2 (2000). 
 26. Id. § 1(b). 
 27. Id. § 1(b)(i)–(iii). 
 28. Id. § 2(b). 
 29. Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms R.S.Q., ch. C-12. 
 30. Id. § 3. 
 31. Id. §§ 5, 9. 
 32. Id. §§ 10–20. 
 33. Section 6 provides: “Every person has a right to the peaceful enjoyment and free disposition 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss3/3
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B. Canada’s Obligations Under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) 
Surprisingly, chapter 11 of NAFTA contains language that seems to 
protect foreign investors’ property rights more robustly than Canadian law 
protects its domestic investors’ property rights. Article 1105, regarding the 
minimum standard of treatment, states that investors from other NAFTA 
states must be treated “in accordance with international law, including fair 
and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”34 Article 1110, 
regarding expropriation and compensation, states that NAFTA parties may 
not “directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an 
investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to 
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment.”35 NAFTA makes 
exceptions where a government expropriates property for a public purpose, 
on a nondiscriminatory basis, in accordance with due process of law and 
article 1105(1), and on payment of compensation.36  
An investor aggrieved by actions that violate chapter 11 has the right to 
bring a claim for compensation directly against the host state.37 Because it 
would be politically and economically difficult for Canada to withdraw 
from NAFTA, the treaty provisions have quasi-constitutional force. 
In Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico,38 a NAFTA arbitration panel found that 
Mexico expropriated Metalclad’s rights to operate a landfill for hazardous 
waste.39 Initially, the Mexican federal government assured Metalclad that 
the company had everything necessary and did not need a municipal 
construction permit.40 On this assurance, Metalclad openly and notoriously 
constructed the landfill until the municipality issued a “Stop Work Order,” 
on the basis of Metalclad’s failure to obtain a municipal construction 
permit.41 The federal government then assured Metalclad that if it applied 
for a municipal construction permit, the municipality would have no legal 
basis for denying the permit, and the municipality would issue the permit 
 
 
of his property, except to the extent provided by law.” Id. § 6. Section 7 provides: “A person’s home is 
inviolable.” Id. § 7. Section 8 provides: “No one may enter upon the property of another or take 
anything therefrom without his express or implied consent.” Id. § 8. 
 34. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.,-Can.-Mex., art. 1105, ¶ 1, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 35. Id. art. 1110, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
 36. Id. art. 1110 ¶ 1(a)-(d). 
 37. Id. arts. 1116, 1117. 
 38. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000). 
 39. Id. ¶ 104. 
 40. Id. ¶ 80. 
 41. Id. ¶ 87. 
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as a matter of course.42 Thirteen months after Metalclad submitted a 
permit application—well after Metalclad completed construction of the 
landfill—the municipality denied the permit without any basis relating to 
flaws in the proposed physical construction or defects in the site.43 The 
municipality denied the permit at a meeting to which Metalclad received 
no notice, no invitation, and no opportunity to appear.44 In addition to 
finding that Metalclad was not treated fairly under article 1105,45 the 
NAFTA panel found that the Mexican government took a measure 
tantamount to expropriation in violation of article 1110 when it acquiesced 
to the municipality’s denial of the permit, even though it had endorsed and 
approved the project.46 
In contrast, the panel in S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada 
took a narrow approach to the scope of article 1110.47 The majority held 
that an “expropriation” or measure tantamount did not occur because (1) 
the investor’s loss was only temporary, and (2) Canada was not enriched 
by the deprivation. 
The majority agreed with the Pope & Talbot tribunal48 that measures 
“tantamount to expropriation” must be measures such as “creeping 
expropriation,” which occurs in steps often disguised as other kinds of 
measures rather than one overt and complete taking.49 When expropriation 
happens over time, such as when land is first designated for future public 
use but is later expropriated, the landowner’s entitlement to compensation 
likely vests only upon the actual taking or final expropriation, when the 
landowner presumably no longer has the ability to continue to utilize the 
land. 
 
 
 42. Id. ¶ 88. 
 43. Id. ¶ 90. 
 44. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, ¶ 91 (2000). 
 45. Id. ¶¶ 100–01. 
 46. Id. ¶ 104. 
 47. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada (U.S. v. Can.) (Nov. 13, 2000), http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/myersvcanadapartialaward_final_13-11-00.pdf. 
 48. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Government of Canada (U.S. v. Can.) (June 26, 2000), http://www. 
appletonlaw.com/cases/P&T-INTERIM%20AWARD.PDF.  
 49. For further information on the concept of creeping expropriation, see Patrick J. Donovan, 
Creeping Expropriation and MIGA: The Need for Tighter Regulation in the Political Risk Insurance 
Market, 7 GONZ. J. INT’L L. (2003-04), available at http://www.gonzagajil.org/pdf/volume7/Donovan/ 
Donovan.pdf. The article defines creeping expropriation as follows: 
Creeping expropriation occurs when a governmental regulatory body changes property rights 
in the attempt to disrupt the enterprise to the point of non-functionality. This may be 
accomplished through the raising of taxes or fees charged the enterprise, the stiffening of 
regulation, or the institution of non-tariff barriers. 
Id. at 10. 
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In a separate concurring opinion, Arbitrator Bryan Schwartz renewed 
expressed concerns that article 1110 would be used by investors in ways 
that would unduly impair the ability of host governments to act in the 
public interest in such areas as environmental regulation.50 Schwartz stated 
that the export ban did not constitute an expropriation, after noting the 
debate over whether article 1110 contains a “regulatory takings” 
doctrine.51 Given the cautious approach NAFTA arbitrators have generally 
taken to “regulatory takings,” chapter 11 of NAFTA will not likely be 
used except in exceptional circumstances where a remedy is needed for 
measures that fall short of the deprivation of property rights.52 
Ideally, better remedies for “regulatory takings” under international 
law will pressure Canadian authorities to adopt a more generous 
compensatory approach for their own citizens. For example, suppose that 
regulatory actions trigger a NAFTA right to compensation for two 
American companies and that a Canadian company was involved in 
similar activities. The Canadian company would argue it is unjust that 
Canadian law does not protect its right to compensation. Canadian 
authorities may agree and ultimately provide compensation. However, the 
cautious approach that NAFTA arbitrators have taken regarding regulatory 
takings suggests that comparing the treatment of foreign nationals to 
Canadian nationals will rarely be a source of useful political leverage. 
IV. THE INTERPRETIVE PRESUMPTION AS APPLIED TO REGULATORY 
TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 
In developing common law and construing statutes, judges have able to 
provide some protection for property rights, subject to legislative override. 
Today, expropriating legislation is construed as containing an implicit and 
legally enforceable right to compensation unless a legislature provides 
otherwise.53 
Property rights in Canada do receive legal protection in one respect. 
There is a common law interpretive presumption that legislatures intend 
 
 
 50. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada (U.S. v. Can.) (Nov. 13, 2000), http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/myersvcanadapartialaward_final_13-11-00.pdf [hereinafter Schwartz]. 
 51. Schwartz, supra note 50, ¶¶ 202–23. 
 52. See generally Emma Aisbett, Larry Karp & Carol McAusland, Regulatory Takings and 
Environmental Regulation in NAFTA’s Chapter 11 (Dep’t of Agric. & Res. Econ., UCB, CUDARE 
Working Paper 1014, 2006), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
1108&context=are_ucb (providing an in-depth analysis of the role of chapter 11 of NAFTA in 
environmental regulation). 
 53. See, e.g., British Columbia Med. Ass’n v. British Columbia, [1984] 58 B.C.L.R. 361 (C.A.), 
leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada refused, [1985] 61 B.C.L.R. xxxii (S.C.C.). 
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expropriatory legislation to contain the right of compensation, unless the 
statutes expressly provide otherwise.54 In applying this presumption, 
Canadian courts have refused to develop an aggressive “regulatory 
takings” doctrine.55  
A. Compensation Denied 
In most cases, compensation is denied to the affected property owner. 
The most common ground for denying compensation, according to Alan 
Macek, is a finding by the courts that only a subset of property rights has 
been removed.56 
1. Property Subset 
In Alberta (Minister of Public Works, Supply and Services) v. 
Nilsson,57 Justice Marceau described the contemporary state of regulatory 
expropriation in Canada. Justice Marceau defined regulatory expropriation 
as a regulation with “sufficient severity to remove virtually all of the rights 
associated with the property holder’s interest.”58 One commentator has 
noted that “this narrow interpretation of property rights allows severe 
restrictions on the use of land without triggering ‘taking’ and 
compensation.”59 
Mariner Real Estate Ltd. v. Nova Scotia usefully illustrates how much 
governments can regulate without compensating affected property 
 
 
 54. Such interpretive presumptions can be quite influential. Canadian administrative law is 
largely rooted in interpretive presumptions. For example, there is a presumption that the legislature 
intends for an administrative body to decide questions in an impartial manner and with procedural 
fairness, thereby allowing an affected person an opportunity to be heard before the matter reaches a 
decision. Bryan Schwartz, Woodward’s Estate: A Case of Non-Constitutional Law, 4 QUEEN L.J. 124 
(1978). 
 55. See generally Alan Macek, Note, Regulatory Expropriations: Takings without 
Compensation? (Mar. 12, 2003), http://www.expropriationlaw.ca/articles/art03700_files/art03701.pdf 
(providing further comments on Canadian law in this area); J. Bruce Melville, Regulatory Takings in 
Canada (July 13, 2003), http://www.expropriationlaw.ca/articles/art00300.asp; see also Raymond E. 
Young, Canadian Law of Constructive Expropriation, 68 U. SASKATCHEWAN L. REV. 345 (2005); 
Donna R. Christie, A Tale of Three Takings: Taking Analysis in Land Use Regulation in the United 
States, Australia and Canada (FSU Coll. of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 186, 2006), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=882096 (providing a more detailed comparative discussion). 
 56. Macek, supra note 55, at 3. 
 57. Alberta (Minister of Public Works, Supply and Services) v. Nilsson, [1999] 70 Alta. L.R.3d 
267 (Alberta Q.B.), aff’d, 2002 ABCA 283 (Alberta Ct. Appeal), available at http://www. 
albertacourts.ab.ca/jdb/1998-2003/ca/Civil/2002/2002abca0283.pdf.  
 58. Nilsson, 70 Alta. L.R.3d at ¶ 48. 
 59. Macek, supra note 55, at 4. 
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owners.60 Here, private individuals owned shore properties that were 
currently undeveloped but potentially valuable. The properties were 
classified as “beaches,” and the private landowners were denied permits to 
build homes on these lands.  
According to Alan Macek,61 the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal found 
that the owners still had some property rights because the owners could 
continue to use their lands for camping and similar low intensity activities. 
The owners still held title to their lands and could therefore continue to use 
their lands. And because the owners were not prohibited from using their 
lands, the provincial expropriation statute, which required government 
authorities to compensate for expropriations, was not triggered. The Court 
specifically found that a loss of economic value was not sufficient 
evidence to show that land had been expropriated. The Court deemed the 
economic losses to be separate from any property losses. Thus, while there 
was no dispute in the case that the land in question had lost significant 
economic value as a result of the home building regulation, the Court 
ultimately held that economic loss did not necessarily imply a loss of the 
rights to the land that trigger a right to compensation. 
In Steer Holdings Ltd. v. Manitoba,62 the complainant owned property 
that straddled a creek. A change in land development regulations 
prohibited the complainant from building a bridge across the creek to 
connect the two pieces of the property. This change in building regulations 
decreased the value of the land significantly. However, the trial judge 
confirmed that “a mere prohibition or dissipation of value is not 
necessarily a taking” and that a public benefit arising out of a regulation 
was not enough to indicate that a transfer of rights had taken place.63 The 
 
 
 60. Mariner Real Estate Ltd. v. Nova Scotia, [1999] 177 D.L.R. (4th) 696 (N.S.C.A.). 
 61. Macek, supra note 55, at 4. 
 62. Steer Holdings Ltd. v. Manitoba, [1992] 21 R.P.R. (2d) 298 (Man. Q.B.). 
 63. Id. at 308. The “public benefit” identified by the trial judge was environmental preservation 
and the development of the surrounding area into a public park: 
Mr. McCaffrey, on behalf of Steer, submitted that by blocking his client’s planned 
commercial project, and probably any other major development on the land, the Bluestem 
Park to the north had been enhanced and that by making it likely that creek bank property 
would remain undeveloped, the public interest was served. This may be true. The residents of 
the area, environmentalists and planners no doubt believe that to be the case. This 
acknowledgment is not, however, tantamount to a finding that there has been the kind of 
confiscation and transferring of interest or benefit of the kind found by the Supreme Court in 
either Manitoba Fisheries (supra) or Tener (supra). Id. at paragraph 39. 
 In this connection, it is noteworthy that although the commercial project which Steer had 
planned was stopped, there is nothing in the legislation that assures or seeks to assure that the 
Steer property will be used or managed in a way that promotes creek bank improvement or 
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appellate court upheld these findings.64 According to Alan Macek, “[t]hese 
authorities show that a decrease in economic value of property is not 
enough to trigger a taking and requiring compensation.”65 
2. Benefit Directed at Government 
According to regulatory takings jurisprudence, a landowner who 
wishes to qualify for compensation must also show that the benefit of the 
regulation is directed at the government and not a third-party. A & L 
Investments Ltd. v. Ontario66 illustrates this principle. In the case, a 
provincial act had the effect of retroactively lowering rents payable by 
tenants. Several landlords sued for compensation, claiming that the 
regulation expropriated their rights. The Ontario Court of Appeals held 
that the transfer of rights had to be for the benefit of the State. Thus, in this 
case, no compensation was payable because the government did not 
directly benefit from the impugned regulation. The Ontario Court of 
Appeals stated that “[t]he limitation on the subject’s property rights must 
be balanced by a corresponding acquisition by the state.”67 
Alan Macek noted that “the current law on the taking of property by 
the government is that rights to the land have to be transfered [sic] to the 
state, not merely extinguished, through the effects of the regulation.”68 
However, the recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeals in 
Rock Resources Inc. v. British Columbia may signal a shift in the direction 
of the law’s development.69 As summarized by R. E. Young,70 
In examining the legislation as a whole to see if some implied 
intention not to pay compensation for a taking of personal property 
might be found, the Court noted that although the Act provided for 
 
 
the public interest. So long as it acts within the law, Steer is free to use its own land as it 
chooses.  
 Id. at paragraph 40. The circumstances which I have described provide no basis for 
concluding that there has been the kind of taking and transferring which gives rise to a legal 
entitlement to compensation. 
Id. at 309.  
 64. Steer Holdings Ltd. v. Manitoba, [1992] 99 D.L.R. (4th) 61 (Man. C.A.). 
 65. Macek, supra note 55, at 9. 
 66. A & L Investments Ltd. v. Ontario, [1997] 36 O.R. (3d) 127 (Ont. C.A.), application for 
leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada dismissed, [1997] S.C.C.A. Nos. 657, 658 (S.C.R.). 
 67. Id. at 134. 
 68. Macek, supra note 55, at 10. 
 69. Rock Resources Inc. v. British Columbia, [2003] 229 D.L.R. (4th) 115 (B.C.C.A.), leave to 
appeal to Supreme Court of Canada dismissed, [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 375 (S.C.C.). 
 70. Young, supra note 55.  
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compensation for real property expropriated, but not for personal 
property, the silence as to personal property in such context was not 
per se sufficient to rebut the operation of the presumption. In the 
face of silence, the Court went on to declare compensation payable 
with respect to personal property and crafted the order to import a 
mechanism for determining compensation [footnotes omitted].71  
Justice Huddart wrote a dissenting opinion that reflected the traditional 
reasoning found in previous Canadian judgments on point, which requires 
an express statutory right before compensation may be awarded. Justice 
Huddart stated the following in paragraph 165 of Rock Resources: “[T]he 
question for me is whether the Court can create a right to compensation 
where the Legislature did not evince an intention to compensate for the 
‘taking’ of a statutory right with commercial value, or provide any 
mechanism for doing so.” In that same paragraph, Justice Huddart further 
stated that silence can “evince only one intention: not to pay 
compensation.”72 
The Canadian Supreme Court’s most recent judgment on this issue 
confirms its continuing reluctance to transplant American notions of a 
regulatory takings doctrine into Canadian law. In Canadian Pacific 
Railway Co. v. Vancouver (City),73 the city of Vancouver adopted a 
development plan that effectively froze the development of a certain parcel 
of land owned by a railway company. The development plan then 
restricted the use of the land to non-economic uses.74 
The railway company argued that the city’s conduct amounted to an 
effective taking of the property in question, thus entitling the Railway to 
compensation.75 The Court disagreed. Chief Justice McLachlin found that 
the railway did not succeed in showing that the city acquired a beneficial 
interest relating to the land in question.76 While the Court acknowledged 
that it would be sufficient to show that the acquisition of a beneficial 
interest related to the property,77 Chief Justice McLachlin noted that 
evidence of such an acquisition was not provided in the instant case.78 
Additionally, the Chief Justice noted that the development plan did not 
 
 
 71. Id. at 362. 
 72. Rock Resources Inc., 229 D.L.R. (4th) at 157. 
 73. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Vancouver (City), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 227, available at 
http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2006/2006scc5/2006scc5.pdf. 
 74. See id. ¶¶ 1–8. 
 75. Id. ¶¶ 27, 29. 
 76. Id. ¶ 32.  
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. ¶¶ 32–33. 
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remove all reasonable uses of the property.79 Thus, Chief Justice 
McLachlin concluded that the City was not required, by statute or by 
common law, to compensate the railway company for the effects of the 
development plan on the company’s land.80 
B. Compensation Granted 
Even when Canadian courts do find that an expropriation has occurred, 
the courts usually grant minimal compensation to the harmed property 
owners. The Canadian Supreme Court’s landmark decision Manitoba 
Fisheries Ltd. v. Canada81 involved a claim for compensation based on de 
facto expropriation. The Court held that the claimant was entitled to 
compensation for the transfer of the goodwill of a private business to the 
new provincial marketing board that gained a monopoly over freshwater 
fish marketing. While it was innovative for the Court to recognize 
“goodwill” as a property interest that could be expropriated, the facts of 
the case satisfy some of the tests for “expropriation” acknowledged in the 
case law generally. Here the private owner lost all of the property at issue 
because it was largely transferred to the government. 
Recent cases show a similar trend. In British Columbia v. Tener,82 the 
claimant owned mineral rights in a provincial park.83 Although British 
Columbia did not formally expropriate the land, it enacted statutes 
requiring owners to get permits before exploring or producing minerals in 
parks.84 The Canadian Supreme Court held that the owner was entitled to 
compensation. Moreover, the Court found that the owner had lost the 
 
 
 79. Id. ¶ 34. 
 Second, the by-law does not remove all reasonable uses of the property. This requirement 
must be assessed “not only in relation to the land’s potential highest and best use, but having 
regard to the nature of the land and the range of reasonable uses to which it has actually been 
put”: see Mariner Real Estate, at p. 717. The by-law does not prevent CPR from using its 
land to operate a railway, the only use to which the land has ever been put during the history 
of the City. Nor, contrary to CPR’s contention, does the by-law prevent maintenance of the 
railway track. Section 559’s definition of “development” is modified by the words “unless the 
context otherwise requires.” Finally, the by-law does not preclude CPR from leasing the land 
for use in conformity with the by-law and from developing public/private partnerships. The 
by-law acknowledges the special nature of the land as the only such intact corridor existing in 
Vancouver, and expands upon the only use the land has known in recent history. 
Id. 
 80. Id. ¶ 63. 
 81. Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. Canada, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 101. 
 82. British Columbia v. Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 533. 
 83. Id. at 536. 
 84. Id. at 536–37. 
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value of his property interest, while the government had gained additional 
property rights. 
V. PROGNOSIS ON THE PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CANADA 
The conclusion is clear: property rights are minimally protected under 
the Canadian Constitution. Moreover, quasi-constitutional documents such 
as the Canadian Bill of Rights and the Quebec Charter offer minimal 
protection. As a result, Canadian courts have no solid grounds to begin to 
develop an aggressive “regulatory takings” doctrine.  
On the contrary, constitutional legal developments have signaled that 
the protection of property rights is ultimately left to democratically elected 
legislatures. Local legislators that fail to work to protect property rights 
are likely to lose confidence among their constituents and to lose the 
business of potential foreign investors. However, judges will not find 
protections of property rights where none are explicitly provided for.  
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